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IN

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

N0. 46892-2019

)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

)

Twin Falls County Case No.
CR-2015-3390

)

V.

)
)

JOSH DILLON STANGER,

)

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

)

Defendant-Appellant.

)
)

IS SUE

Has Stanger

failed to

show

the district court abused

its

discretion

by

refusing to retain

jurisdiction 0r further reduce his sentence?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Josh Dillon Stanger pled guilty to failing to register as a sex offender.
district court

on probation

(R., p.37.)

The

imposed a sentence of ten years ﬁxed, suspended the sentence, and placed Stanger
for a period

0f ten years.

(R., p.71.)

Stanger’s probation on the bases that Stanger

The

state

subsequently

moved Without permission,

moved

lost his

to

revoke

employment by

failing to

show up

to

work, and absconded from his supervision.

t0 all three probation Violations.

imposed the

original sentence,

(R., p.85.)

The

district court

(R., pp.76-77.)

revoked Stanger’s probation,

and retained jurisdiction for 365 days.

During the period 0f retained jurisdiction, the

and placed him on probation for three years.

district court

(R., p.93.)

The

Stanger admitted

state

(R., p.86.)

suspended Stanger’s sentence
subsequently

moved

Stanger’s probation on the bases that he had an unapproved sexual relationship With a

had physical custody 0f children and
used methamphetamine.

The

district court

that Stanger

(R., p.107.)

consumed

re-

alcohol, abused

t0

revoke

woman Who

muscle relaxers, and

Stanger admitted to the probation Violations.

revoked Stanger’s probation and executed his sentence

(R., p.1 17.)

after reducing the

sentence t0 a uniﬁed term of ten years with seven years ﬁxed. (R., p. 124.)

Stanger timely appealed. (R., pp.128-32.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The decision whether to

m,

retain jurisdiction

is

reviewed for an abuse 0f discretion. See

141 Idaho 673, 676-77, 115 P.3d 764, 767-68 (Ct. App. 2005).

a sentence

is

m

When evaluating whether

excessive, the court considers the entire length 0f the sentence under an abuse 0f

discretion standard. State V. McIntosh, 160 Idaho

1, 8,

146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008).

368 P.3d 621, 628 (2016); State

Similarly,

when

V. Stevens,

the district court orders the

execution 0f a suspended sentence, “[a] decision to refuse t0 reduce the sentence earlier

pronounced Will be disturbed 0n appeal only upon a showing
discretion.” State V. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 27,

218 P.3d

5,

that the trial court

7 (Ct. App. 2009).

abused

its

ARGUMENT
T0 Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion BV ReﬁJsing T0
Retain Jurisdiction Or Further Reduce Stanger’s Sentence

Stanger Has Failed

The

district court

did not abuse

can be n0 abuse of discretion in a

upon which

sufﬁcient information

m,

probation.”

trial

to

its

discretion

when

court’s refusal to retain jurisdiction if the court already has

conclude that the defendant

141 Idaho at 677, 115 P.3d at 768.

Stanger’s “history shows that he
(2/ 12/2019 Tr., p. 10, Ls.

1

is

reﬁJsed to retain jurisdiction. “There

it

As

is

not a suitable candidate for

the prosecutor explained at the hearing,

incapable 0f complying With the requirements 0f probation.”

been put on probation in this case and has twice

8-19.) Stanger has twice

admitted t0 multiple Violations that resulted in his probation being revoked. (R., pp.85,
Stanger’s performance on his ﬁrst rider program

Given

was “very

1

17.)

And

dicey.” (2/12/2019 Tr., p.9, Ls.1-6.)

that recent history, the district court did not abuse

its

discretion

by refusing

to retain

jurisdiction yet again.

Similarly, the district court did not abuse

its

discretion

When

it

refused t0 further reduce

Stanger’s sentence. This Court applies the well-established standards governing whether a

sentence

is

excessive to a district court’s reﬁlsal t0 apply Rule 35 and reduce a previously imposed

sentence at the time of a probation revocation.

5,

“When

7 (Ct. App. 2009).

sentence

is

E

State V. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 27,

presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must

218 P.3d

show

that the

excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided t0 the district

court in support ofthe Rule 35 motion.” State V. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840

(2007).

It is

presumed

0f conﬁnement. State
is

that the

ﬁxed portion of the sentence

V. Oliver,

Will be the defendant’s probable term

144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 687, 391 (2007). Where a sentence

within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that

it is

a clear abuse of

McIntosh, 160 Idaho

discretion.

must show the sentence

the appellant

A

sentence

is

368 P.3d

at 8,

reasonable if

is

The

Li.

differing weights

district court

628

(citations omitted).

To

carry this burden

excessive under any reasonable View 0f the facts. Li.

appears necessary t0 accomplish the primary objective of

it

protecting society and t0 achieve any 0r

retribution.

at

all

of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, 0r

has the discretion t0 weigh those objectives and give them

when deciding upon the

sentence.

Idaho 814, 825, 965 P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (holding

I_d.

at 9,

368 P.3d

district court

at

629; State V. Moore, 131

did not abuse

its

discretion in

concluding that the obj ectives of punishment, deterrence and protection 0f society outweighed the

need for

“In deference t0 the

rehabilitation).

trial

judge, this Court Will not substitute

a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at

at

628 (quoting

ﬁxed within
discretion

by

m,

146 Idaho

the limits prescribed

the trial court.”

Li

148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27).

at

its

8,

View 0f

368 P.3d

Furthermore, “[a] sentence

the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of

by

(quoting State V. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324

(1982)).

Here, the district court could not have abused its discretion When

it

refused to further reduce

Stanger’s sentence under Rule 35 because Stanger did not present the district court with any
0r additional information that

Huffman, 144 Idaho

“new and

at

was not

203, 159 P.3d

additional information”:

employment opportunity,

(3) Stanger

or additional.

840.

at

E

Stanger points to four categories of What he calls

(1) Stanger has a supportive family, (2) Stanger

had access

accepted responsibility for his actions.

new

available at the time of the original sentencing.

new

t0 substance

had an

abuse treatment, and (4) Stanger

(Appellant’s brief, pp.5-6.)

None of that

information

is

First,

Stanger points to a

from his mother as “new and additional information”

letter

(Appellant’s brief, p5), but she also wrote a letter for his original sentencing that expressed the

same sentiments
“Here

am

I

(PSI, p.271).

again writing a

In fact, Stanger’s mother’s letter for the disposition hearing starts:

behalf of my son Josh Stanger.” (R., p.191 (emphasis

letter in [sic]

Stanger’s opening brief omits any mention 0f his mother’s letter from the original

added).)

sentencing and
his neighbor,

fails to

mention

two ofhis cousins,

that his father, three brothers, a brother-in-law,

his friend,

for Stanger’s original sentencing.

and numerous other individuals wrote

(PSI, pp.27-56.)

concerning Stanger’s family support

is

an aunt, an uncle,

that

The only “new and

he seems to have a

lot less

letters

of support

additional information”

of it

now

than at the time

ofhis original sentencing. Less family support does not warrant a further reduction to his sentence.

Second, Stanger says his employment opportunity constitutes “new and additional
information” (Appellant’s brief, p.5), but at the time ofhis original sentencing Stanger was actually

employed

(PSI, p.14).

employee.” (PSI,

now has

His employer veriﬁed his employment and described Stanger as a “good

p. 14.)

The

fact that

he had actual employment

at the

time 0f his sentencing but

only the opportunity for employment does not warrant a further reduction t0 his sentence.

Third, Stanger claims

“new and

additional information” in the form of his attendance at a

substance abuse treatment program (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-6), but he was also attending a
substance abuse treatment program at the time of his original sentencing (PSI, pp.17-19). Prior to
his original sentencing, Stanger “advised

his church.”

(PSI, p.19.)

was not new 0r

he has attended weekly meetings more recently through

Because Stanger’s attendance

additional information,

it

at

a substance abuse treatment program

did not require the district court t0 further reduce his

original sentence.

1

Citations t0 PSI refer t0 the electronic pagination of the conﬁdential exhibits
5

PDF.

Fourth, Stanger argues that his acceptance of responsibility also qualiﬁes as

(Appellant’s brief, pp.5-6.) But Stanger accepted responsibility for his

additional information.”

crime prior to his original sentencing: “I failed t0 reg as a sex offender. Because

my address.

I

having t0 do

so,

will never

But

times.” (PSI, p.4.)

“new and

do

now

I

this

again

I

Will always

didn’t

want

remember

The only thing “new” about

t0

because

to update

I

am

didn’t change

embarrassed and ashamed 0f

my information

his acceptance

I

so

it is

of responsibility

is

correct at all

that

now he

is

also accepting responsibility for Violating the terms ofhis probation. (Appellant’s brief, p.6.) That

acceptance of responsibility, while perhaps meaningful in determining the consequence 0f the
probation Violation, did not require the district court to further reduce the original sentence, which
the district court

In

all

imposed before the probation Violation occurred.

events, the district court did not abuse

its

Stanger’s sentence because his as—reduced sentence

27,

218 P.3d

at 7.

As

TL, p.17, Ls.12-19.) And, as the
(2/ 12/2019 Tr., p.16, Ls.

16,

and injury

was

the district court observed,

community” When deciding the extent

1

t0

which

it

discretion

it

when

reasonable.

had

it

E

reﬁlsed t0 ﬁthher reduce

Hanington, 148 Idaho

t0 consider “the protection

of the

should reduce Stanger’s sentence. (2/12/2019

district court noted,

Stanger has a “bad, bad criminal history”

5-21), including convictions for forgery,

t0 a child (PSI, pp.5-7). In addition, Stanger

lewd conduct with a child under

had already beneﬁtted from numerous

second chances but continued t0 commit serious crimes. (2/12/2019 TL, p.16, L.22 — p. 17, L.1
Thus, the

district court’s decision to

at

1.)

reduce Stanger’s sentence from ten years ﬁxed t0 ten years

With seven years ﬁxed was not an abuse 0f discretion.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court afﬁrm the

district court’s

decision t0 revoke

Stanger’s probation and reduce his previously imposed sentence.

DATED this

17th day of September, 2019.

/s/

Jeff Nye

JEFF

NYE

Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

correct

HEREBY CERTIFY

copy of the foregoing

that

I

have

day of September, 2019, served a true and
BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of

this 17th

RESPONDENT’S

iCourt File and Serve:

JENNY C. SWINFORD
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us.

/s/

Jeff Nye

JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General

